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Chain of thought is a natural inference-time method for increasing the computational power of transformer-based large language models (LLMs), but comes at the cost of sequential decoding. Are there more efficient alternatives to expand a transformer's expressive power without adding parameters? We consider transformers with padding tokens as a form of parallelizable test-time compute. We show that averaging-hard-attention, masked-pre-norm transformers with polynomial padding recognize precisely the class FO -uniform TC of extremely parallelizable problems. While the TC upper bound was known, proving a matching lower bound had been elusive. Further, our novel analysis reveals the precise expanded power of padded transformers when coupled with another form of inference-time compute, namely dynamically increasing depth via looping. Our core technical contribution is to show how padding helps bring the notions of complete problems and reductions, which have been a cornerstone of classical complexity theory, to the formal study of transformers. Armed with this new tool, we prove that padded transformers with looping on inputs of length recognize exactly the class FO -uniform TC of moderately parallelizable problems. Thus, padding and looping together systematically expand transformers' expressive power: with polylogarithmic looping, polynomially padded transformers recognize precisely the class FO -uniform NC , the best that could be expected without losing parallelism (unless NCP ). Our results thus motivate further exploration of padding and looping as parallelizable alternatives to chain of thought for test-time compute. 

State-space models (SSMs) have emerged as a potential alternative architecture for building large language models (LLMs) compared to the previously ubiquitous transformer architecture. One theoretical weakness of transformers is that they cannot express certain kinds of sequential computation and state tracking (Merrill & Sabharwal, 2023), which SSMs are explicitly designed to address via their close architectural similarity to recurrent neural networks (RNNs). But do SSMs truly have an advantage (over transformers) in expressive power for state tracking? Surprisingly, the answer is no. Our analysis reveals that the expressive power of SSMs is limited very similarly to transformers: SSMs cannot express computation outside the complexity class 𝖳𝖢0. In particular, this means they cannot solve simple state-tracking problems like permutation composition. It follows that SSMs are provably unable to accurately track chess moves with certain notation, evaluate code, or track entities in a long narrative. To supplement our formal analysis, we report experiments showing that Mamba-style SSMs indeed struggle with state tracking. Thus, despite its recurrent formulation, the "state" in an SSM is an illusion: SSMs have similar expressiveness limitations to non-recurrent models like transformers, which may fundamentally limit their ability to solve real-world state-tracking problems. 

Do LMs infer the semantics of text from co-occurrence patterns in their training data? Merrill et al. (2022) argue that, in theory, sentence co-occurrence probabilities predicted by an optimal LM should reflect the entailment relationship of the constituent sentences, but it is unclear whether probabilities predicted by neural LMs encode entailment in this way because of strong assumptions made by Merrill et al. (namely, that humans always avoid redundancy). In this work, we investigate whether their theory can be used to decode entailment relations from neural LMs. We find that a test similar to theirs can decode entailment relations between natural sentences, well above random chance, though not perfectly, across many datasets and LMs. This suggests LMs implicitly model aspects of semantics to predict semantic effects on sentence co-occurrence patterns. However, we find the test that predicts entailment in practice works in the opposite direction to the theoretical test. We thus revisit the assumptions underlying the original test, finding its derivation did not adequately account for redundancy in human-written text. We argue that better accounting for redundancy related to explanations might derive the observed flipped test and, more generally, improve computational models of speakers in linguistics. 

Recent theoretical work has identified surprisingly simple reasoning problems, such as checking if two nodes in a graph are connected or simulating finite-state machines, that are provably unsolvable by standard transformers that answer immediately after reading their input. However, in practice, transformers' reasoning can be improved by allowing them to use a "chain of thought" or "scratchpad", i.e., generate and condition on a sequence of intermediate tokens before answering. Motivated by this, we ask: Does such intermediate generation fundamentally extend the computational power of a decoder-only transformer? We show that the answer is yes, but the amount of increase depends crucially on the amount of intermediate generation. For instance, we find that transformer decoders with a logarithmic number of decoding steps (w.r.t. the input length) push the limits of standard transformers only slightly, while a linear number of decoding steps, assuming projected pre-norm (a slight generalization of standard pre-norm), adds a clear new ability (under standard complexity conjectures): recognizing all regular languages. Our results also imply that linear steps keep transformer decoders within context-sensitive languages, and polynomial steps with generalized pre-norm make them recognize exactly the class of polynomial-time solvable problems—the first exact characterization of a type of transformers in terms of standard complexity classes. Together, this provides a nuanced framework for understanding how the length of a transformer’s chain of thought or scratchpad impacts its reasoning power. 

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make. 

Pretraining language models on formal language can improve their acquisition of natural language. Which features of the formal language impart an inductive bias that leads to effective transfer? Drawing on insights from linguistics and complexity theory, we hypothesize that effective transfer occurs when two conditions are met: the formal language should capture the dependency structures present in natural language, and it should remain within the computational limitations of the model architecture. We experiment with pre-pretraining (training on formal language before natural languages) on transformers and find that formal languages capturing hierarchical dependencies indeed enable language models to achieve lower loss on natural language and better linguistic generalization compared to other formal languages. We also find modest support for the hypothesis that the formal language should fall within the computational limitations of the architecture. Strikingly, pre-pretraining reduces loss more efficiently than training on a matched amount of natural language. For a 1B-parameter language model trained on roughly 1.6B tokens of natural language, pre-pretraining achieves the same loss and better linguistic generalization with a 33% smaller token budget. Finally, we also give mechanistic evidence of transfer from formal to natural language: attention heads acquired during pre-pretraining remain crucial for the model's performance on syntactic evaluations. 

One way to interpret the reasoning power of transformer-based language models is to describe the types of logical rules they can resolve over some input text. Recently, Chiang et al. (2023) showed that finite-precision transformers can be equivalently expressed in a generalization of first-order logic. However, finite-precision transformers are a weak transformer variant because, as we show, a single head can only attend to a constant number of tokens and, in particular, cannot represent uniform attention. Since attending broadly is a core capability for transformers, we ask whether a minimally more expressive model that can attend universally can also be characterized in logic. To this end, we analyze transformers whose forward pass is computed in logn precision on contexts of length n. We prove that any log-precision transformer can be equivalently expressed as a first-order logic sentence that, in addition to standard universal and existential quantifiers, may also contain majority-vote quantifiers. This is the tightest known upper bound and first logical characterization of log-precision transformers. 

Despite their omnipresence in modern NLP, characterizing the computational power of transformer neural nets remains an interesting open question. We prove that transformers whose arithmetic precision is logarithmic in the number of input tokens (and whose feedforward nets are computable using space linear in their input) can be simulated by constant-depth logspace-uniform threshold circuits. This provides insight on the power of transformers using known results in complexity theory. For example, if L≠P (i.e., not all poly-time problems can be solved using logarithmic space), then transformers cannot even accurately solve linear equalities or check membership in an arbitrary context-free grammar with empty productions. Our result intuitively emerges from the transformer architecture's high parallelizability. We thus speculatively introduce the idea of a fundamental parallelism tradeoff: any model architecture as parallelizable as the transformer will obey limitations similar to it. Since parallelism is key to training models at massive scale, this suggests a potential inherent weakness of the scaling paradigm. 

Training a referring expression comprehension (ReC) model for a new visual domain requires collecting referring expressions, and potentially corresponding bounding boxes, for images in the domain. While large-scale pre-trained models are useful for image classification across domains, it remains unclear if they can be applied in a zero-shot manner to more complex tasks like ReC. We present ReCLIP, a simple but strong zero-shot baseline that repurposes CLIP, a state-of-the-art large-scale model, for ReC. Motivated by the close connection between ReC and CLIP’s contrastive pre-training objective, the first component of ReCLIP is a region-scoring method that isolates object proposals via cropping and blurring, and passes them to CLIP. However, through controlled experiments on a synthetic dataset, we find that CLIP is largely incapable of performing spatial reasoning off-the-shelf. We reduce the gap between zero-shot baselines from prior work and supervised models by as much as 29% on RefCOCOg, and on RefGTA (video game imagery), ReCLIP’s relative improvement over supervised ReC models trained on real images is 8%. 

Much recent work in NLP has documented dataset artifacts, bias, and spurious correlations between input features and output labels. However, how to tell which features have “spurious” instead of legitimate correlations is typically left unspecified. In this work we argue that for complex language understanding tasks, all simple feature correlations are spurious, and we formalize this notion into a class of problems which we call competency problems. For example, the word “amazing” on its own should not give information about a sentiment label independent of the context in which it appears, which could include negation, metaphor, sarcasm, etc. We theoretically analyze the difficulty of creating data for competency problems when human bias is taken into account, showing that realistic datasets will increasingly deviate from competency problems as dataset size increases. This analysis gives us a simple statistical test for dataset artifacts, which we use to show more subtle biases than were described in prior work, including demonstrating that models are inappropriately affected by these less extreme biases. Our theoretical treatment of this problem also allows us to analyze proposed solutions, such as making local edits to dataset instances, and to give recommendations for future data collection and model design efforts that target competency problems.